

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-9289
TO INFO	Chief of Base, Munich Chief of Station, Germany	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 74-126-44/3	
FROM	Chief, SE	DATE	8 JUN 1960
SUBJECT	REXWOOD/ARSHUR Status of Project ARSHUR	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	FIG	<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S) A. HMM 10005, 1 April 1960 B. HMM 90019, 20 May 1960 C. HMM 09105, 11 May 1960	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007		
<p>1. In this dispatch we want to cover several aspects of Project ARSHUR, as HMM did in Reference A. We shall try also to bring the Field up to date on Headquarters thinking on the project, as well as to inform you of what transpired here between ARSHUR/A and the ARSHUR desk.</p> <p>2. ARSHUR/A came to Washington on 1 April to arrange with Headquarters for transfer of the ARSHUR/A South benefits. The final figure arrived at was \$32,948.31. The money has been transferred in two installments by cashier's check to the non-profit foundation in New York set up for that specific purpose.</p> <p>3. On 6 April the undersigned met ARSHUR/A to discuss operational matters. ARSHUR/A proved to be as willing to cooperate as the Field had predicted. We brought up the question of how he planned to use the money he was to receive for his organization. ARSHUR/A outlined his plans for a Belorussian memorial center and archives per our previous information. He cited good reasons for locating the center in Europe as [] had suggested to him, but he added that it would be difficult to persuade the members of the non-profit foundation (set up on HMM's advice), to whom the money was sent, to accept a change from the originally intended New York site. At our next and last meeting on 12 May, ARSHUR/A reported that the situation remained the same as a month earlier. The members of the foundation were still holding out for New York. There seems to be no point in pursuing the matter further with ARSHUR/A; he is himself convinced that the center belongs in Europe, but unfortunately he has lost control of the funds. In any case, this question will not be settled soon. On the positive side, we note that ARSHUR/A's opinion still swings a lot of weight in his group, and he still hopes to change the foundation's collective mind.</p> <p>4. Concerning HMM-type operations: ARSHUR/A was eager to establish his organization as a tool for HMM operational use. He repeated the substance of what was presented in Reference A on ARSHUR/A's capabilities with special emphasis on the vulnerability of Belorussia by way of the Belorussian community in Poland. We registered some skepticism on this score on the grounds that HMM (as opposed to HMM) operations run through Poland are complicated and one step further removed from adequate control and support; furthermore, such operations would have to contend with the unfriendly interest of two hostile security services instead of one. (Our first indication of the interest in the Belorussian and Ukrainian minorities of Poland was forwarded to the Field in HMM-8873.) ARSHUR/A countered with the argument that while many travelers pass through Belorussia on their way to other parts of the Soviet Union, there are few who are allowed to spend much time in any one place there. (ARSHUR/A then weakened his case somewhat by describing an incident operational opportunity which we presented to the Field in HMM-37610.) Whatever Headquarters' reservations about the potential of HMM-type operations by way of Poland, we believe that the only way to assess these opportunities realistically is to rely on the first-hand experience of a controlled observer. It is hoped that the subject of HMM-9289 will be able to fulfill the need. As for Identity 13 of Reference A, we would like to know more about his potential role. It would seem that although he will never be a "controlled" agent, he might provide considerable support to ARSHUR/A operational effort. He represents one of the elements which cause us to believe that an ARSHUR/A event center in Western Europe would contribute more to the project's development than one in the United States.</p>			
FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	CS COPY 74-126-44/3 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED PAGE NO. 1

5. It is possible that literature distribution using Poland as a base offers advantages over trying to infiltrate material directly into Belorussia from a western country. However, the KUBARK follow-up which sometimes results from KUBARK operations and which should be actively pursued, is another matter. If such cases arise, we might consider recontact of a Soviet Belorussian target entirely separate from the original KUBARK distribution mechanism based in Poland.

1500 Pesetas
6. As the Field predicted, ARCAMBISTA/4 made a determined plea for support of the Belorussian-language program sponsored by ARCAMBISTA/1 on Radio Madrid. He stated that unless outside financial help is forthcoming, this activity will have to be dropped. He asked for a yearly subsidy of \$4,000.00 for the program (two daily fifteen minute broadcasts). This figure he broke down into monthly remuneration of \$170.00 each for the two ARCAMBISTA/1 staffers and their wives, who also help to produce the programs. ARCAMBISTA/4 said the two families are currently receiving 100 pesetas (about \$25.00) a month from the Spanish Government and that the remainder of their support has been collected from members and supporters of ARCAMBISTA/1 in Europe and North America, including \$850.00 out of ARCAMBISTA/4's own pocket last year. ARCAMBISTA/4 stated that this support could not continue much longer. The request for financial aid was linked by ARCAMBISTA/4 with the assertion that Radio Madrid is an effective KUBARK instrument. He submitted several letters (the same letters which the Field referred to in Reference A and C) which indicated that Radio Madrid is definitely heard in Eastern Poland. These letters also purported to show that the program is well received by Belorussians in Poland. We are currently checking into other sources of information on the effectiveness of Radio Nacional and will give serious consideration to ARCAMBISTA/4's request shortly.

7. We should like to take up other aspects of ARCAMBISTA/1 operations touched upon in reference. As to what you call the "inherent weaknesses in dealing with or through another organization" in paragraph 10 of Reference A, we believe that these weaknesses and difficulties can be best minimized through close case officer supervision, by the application of high standards to ARCAMBISTA/1 reporting, by limiting operational knowledgeability within the organization and, in appropriate cases, by direct participation of the case officer himself in operations. The latter is particularly applicable to the training, briefing and debriefing of KUBARKIN travellers to the USSR, since, to the best of our knowledge, ARCAMBISTA/1 has no one for this job with much experience or training. We note from the attachments to Reference C that you are currently planning an "unwitting" briefing for KUBARKIN. The FIA obtained in this case permits direct case officer participation and KUBARKIN and we wonder whether it would not be wise for to play a direct role in the training and briefing. We would then be in a far better position to judge the results of the operation, and many of the drawbacks in operating through the group could be eliminated.

8. It seems to us that the key element in the operation/plan presented in Reference is the operations chief, now ARCAMBISTA/15. Holding down a full-time job with FICHERD as he does, it is difficult to see how ARCAMBISTA/15 will have much time for ARCAMBISTA/1 operations, particularly if travel is necessary; nor has he had special operational briefing. Still it would probably be unwise to consider employing a full-time operations chief until the ARCAMBISTA/1 operational potential has been proved worthy of greater investment. Recommendations from the Field on this score are solicited.

9. We are sure the Field appreciates the need for developing ARCAMBISTA/1 operationally with due regard for security. We are currently conducting a review of the files to bring security clearances of appropriate project personalities up to date and will try to inform you of cases where work is needed. To facilitate security procedures, please keep Headquarters fully informed on persons with any operational involvement, taking into consideration the time element. A clearance should be obtained on any individual knowledgeable on an operation, regardless of whether he is aware of KUBARK involvement or not, and it can usually be obtained in just a few days. We do not have a clear reading on the state of security within ARCAMBISTA/1 but we assume that there will always be a tendency for operational information to become known to more people than necessary, as there has been in the past in the organization. We therefore recommend that ARCAMBISTA/15 be specifically cautioned on this score. A tightening up in the beginning might save us

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headaches later on. It would be a great help to Headquarters to have an up-to-date rundown on just who is who in AHCANBETA/1, with special attention paid to how they fit into your operational plans and the AHCANBETA/1 operational set-up. The collection of contact reports forwarded with Reference A and C presented Headquarters with a good detailed view of recent AHCANBETA developments. Such reports, together with whatever extra comments the case officer might care to add in the covering dispatch, are entirely satisfactory as a monthly report. Certainly no additional summary of events is necessary.

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(31 May 1960)

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